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Abstract
Recent evidence by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvstov
(2004) shows that the average price duration for US CPI-basket goods is
in the order of one to two quarters, challenging the monetary business cy-
cle research to try and explain how short price durations can nevertheless
generate a large degree of aggregate inﬂation persistence. We empirically
test the relevance of a cascading structure of production as an explana-
tion for short price durations and large aggregate inﬂation persistence.
The ﬁnal good is produced through a chain of intermediate goods, which
undergo several processing stages. At e a c hs t a g et h ep r i c ei ss e ti nn o m i n a l
terms, and can be adjusted only at random intervals. Though each indi-
vidual price is adjusted frequently, because the ﬁnal good price embeds
the intermediate price movements, it will turn out to have a large degree
of stickiness. We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques to evalu-
ate the relative role of indexation, pricing contracts length, and cascading
production structure in the US postwar data. The estimation shows that
short pricing contracts within the standard Calvo pricing mechanism are
compatible with large inﬂation persistence, and inﬂation indexation turns
out to play a much less relevant role - in other words, it ends up being a
reduced-form model for the cascading production structure.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The recent literature on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of the
business cycle has focused on ﬁnding optimizing microfoundations for two im-
portant features observed in US data: a large degree of inﬂation inertia, and a
persistent impact on output of monetary policy shocks. Both these features have
proven challenging for the most popular modeling setups, namely the New Key-
naesian paradigm, requiring the introduction of exogenous inﬂation indexation
in the ﬁrm’s pricing policies (justiﬁed as quasi-optimal rule of thumb behaviour,
for example, in Gali and Gertler, 1999) and relatively long duration of pricing
policies in models with nominal price rigidity (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 2005). Recent evidence by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and
Kryvstov (2004) shows instead that the average price duration for US CPI-
basket goods is in the order of one to two quarters. The inﬂation dynamics
literature has produced alternative, and increasingly sophisticated models of
optimal pricing to try and explain how short price durations can nevertheless
generate a large degree of aggregate inﬂation persistence (Golosov and Lucas,
2003, Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2004).
This paper evaluates a mechanism ﬁrst explored by Basu (1995) and re-
cently investigated by Dotsey and King (2005) and Huang and Liu (2001 and
2004) as an explanation for short price durations and large aggregate inﬂation
persistence: a cascading structure of production. We assume the ﬁnal good is
produced through a chain of intermediate goods, which undergo several process-
ing stages. At each stage the price is set in nominal terms, and can be adjusted
only at random intervals, consistently with the Calvo model of staggered price
a d j u s t m e n t . T h o u g hi ne a c hs e c t o rt h ep rice is adjusted frequently, because
the ﬁnal goods price embeds the price movements of all intermediate goods, it
w i l lt u r no u tt oh a v eal a r g ed e g r e eo fs t i c k i n e s s .T h es a m er e s u l t sc a nb eo b -
tained through an input-output production structure, where ﬁrms’ production
is horizontally rather than vertically integrated.
We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques to evaluate the relative
roles of indexation, pricing contract length, and cascading production structure
in the US postwar data. We show that once the cascading production structure
is introduced, US data favor a speciﬁcation with short pricing contracts. Within
the standard Calvo pricing mechanism, short individual price duration is there-
fore compatible with large inﬂation persistence. Inﬂation indexation turns out
to play a much less relevant role than previously estimated - in other words, it
ends up being a reduced-form model for the cascading production structure.
22 The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of measure one of households indexed by
i ∈ [0,1], a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1], a continuum of ﬁnancial
intermediaries indexed by z ∈ [0,1], and a government.
2.1 Households
Household i maximizes lifetime utility, which depends on his per capita con-
sumption Ct(i),l e i s u r e1 − Lt(i) (where 1 is the ﬁxed time endowment and
Lt(i) is labor supply), and real money balances Mt(i)/Pt (where Mt(i) is nom-
inal money and Pt is the aggregate price index):
Max E0
∞ X
t=0
β
t
(
Sc
t(1 − v)log(Ht(i)) − SL
t ψ
Lt(i)
1+ 1
γ
1+ 1
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Mt(i)
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(1)
Throughout, shocks are denoted by Sx
t ,w h e r ex is the variable subject to the
shock. Households exhibit external habit persistence with respect to Ci
t,w i t h
habit parameter ν:
Ht(i)=Ct(i) − νCt−1 . (2)
Consumption Ci
t is a CES aggregator over individual varieties ct(i,j),w i t h
time-varying elasticity of substitution σt > 1,
Ct(i)=
µZ 1
0
ct(i,j)
σt−1
σt dj
¶ σt
σt−1
, (3)
and the aggregate price index Pt is the consumption based price index associated
with this consumption aggregator,
Pt =
µZ 1
0
Pt(j)1−σtdj
¶ 1
1−σt
. (4)
Households accumulate capital according to
Kt+1(i)=( 1− ∆)Kt(i)+It(i) . (5)
We assume that demand for investment goods takes the same CES form as
demand for consumption goods, equation (3), which implies identical demand
functions for goods varieties j.
In addition to capital, households accumulate money and one period nominal
government bonds Bt(i) with gross nominal return it.1 Their income consists of
nominal wage income Wt(i)Lt(i), nominal returns to utilized capital Rk
txtKt(i),
where xt is the rate of capital utilization, and lump-sum proﬁt redistributions
1All ﬁnancial interest rates and inﬂation rates, but not rates of return to capital, are
expressed in gross terms.
3from ﬁrms and intermediaries
R 1
0 Πt(i,j)dj and
R 1
0 Πt(i,z)dz. Expenditure con-
sists of consumption spending PtCt(i), investment spending PtIt(i)(1 + SI
t ),
where SI
t is an investment shock, the cost of utilizing capital at a rate diﬀerent
from 100% Pta(xt)Kt(i),w h e r e¯ x =1and a(1) = 0, lump-sum taxation Ptτt,
quadratic capital and investment adjustment costs, and quadratic costs of de-
viating from the economywide average labor supply (more on this below). The
budget constraint is therefore
Bt(i)=( 1 + it−1)Bt−1(i)+Mt−1(i) − Mt(i) (6)
+Wt(i)Lt(i)+Rk
txtKt(i) − Pta(xt)Kt(i)
+
Z 1
0
Πt(i,j)dj +
Z 1
0
Πz
t(i,z)dz − Ptτt(i)
−PtCt(i) − PtIt(i)(1 + SI
t )
−Pt
θk
2
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µ
It(i)
Kt(i)
− ∆
¶2
− Pt
θi
2
Kt(i)
µ
It(i)
Kt(i)
−
It−1
Kt−1
¶2
−Wt
φw
2
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2
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.
We assume complete contingent claims markets for labor income, and identi-
cal initial endowments of capital, bonds and money. Then all optimality condi-
tions will be the same across households, except for labor supply. We therefore
drop the index i. The multiplier for the budget constraint (6) is denoted by
λt/Pt, and the multiplier of the capital accumulation equation (5) is λtqt,w h e r e
qt is Tobin’s q. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions for ct(j), Bt, Ct, It, Kt+1,a n d
xt are as follows:
ct(j)=Ct
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶−σt
, (7)
λt = βitEt
µ
λt+1
πt+1
¶
, (8)
Sc
t(1 − v)
Ht
= λt , (9)
qt =1+θk
µ
It
Kt
− ∆
¶
+ θi
µ
It
Kt
−
It−1
Kt−1
¶
+ SI
t , (10)
λtqt = βEtλt+1
£
qt+1(1 − ∆)+rk
t+1 (11)
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,
ˆ rk
t =  ˆ xt , (12)
4where   = a00(x)/a0(x) > 0. We will return to the household’s wage setting
problem at a later point, as we will be able to exploit analogies with ﬁrms’
price setting. Full derivations of all ﬁrst-order conditions in the paper, their
transformation into a stationary system through normalization by technology
and the inﬂation target, and their linearization, are presented in a separate
Technical Appendix (available on request).
2.2 Firms
Each ﬁrm j sells a distinct product variety. Heterogeneity in price setting deci-
sions and therefore in demand for individual products arises because each ﬁrm
receives its price changing opportunities at diﬀerent, random points in time.
We ﬁrst describe the cost minimization problem and then move on to proﬁt
maximization.
2.2.1 Cost Minimization
The production function for variety j is Cobb-Douglas in labor  t(j), capital
kt(j) and intermediate goods Nt(j):
yt(j)=
h
(S
y
t  t(j))
1−α kt(j)α
i1−η
Nt(j)η , (13)
where
 t(j)=
µZ 1
0
Lt(i,j)
σw
t −1
σw
t di
¶
σw
t
σw
t −1
, (14)
kt(j)=
µZ 1
0
kt(z,j)
σk−1
σk dz
¶ σk
σk−1
, (15)
Nt(j)=
µZ 1
0
Nt(x,j)
σt−1
σt dz
¶ σt
σt−1
, (16)
where the last three equations state that each ﬁrm employs a CES aggregate of
diﬀerent labor, capital and intermediates varieties supplied by diﬀerent house-
holds, ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁrms. Let wt be the aggregate real wage (the
cost of hiring the aggregate (14)), and ut the aggregate user cost of capital (the
cost of hiring the aggregate (15)). These are determined in competitive factor
markets and discussed in more detail below. Intermediate goods are simply an
aggregate of ﬁnal output varieties yt (j), and are demanded by each ﬁrm subject
to a CES technology (16) that is identical to household and investor demand
for ﬁnal output. Then the real marginal cost corresponding to (13) is
mct = A
µ
wt
S
y
t
¶(1−α)(1−η)
(ut)
α(1−η) , (17)
where A =( α(1 − η))
−(α(1−η)) ((1 − α)(1 − η))
−((1−α)(1−η)) η−η.I n t r o d u c i n g
multiple layers of cascading subject to market power at every level tends to make
5economic proﬁts a very sizeable component of ﬁnal GDP, while correspondingly
reducing the shares of labor and capital. We therefore introduce ﬁxed costs of
production, following Altig et al. (2005), such that in steady state a ﬁrm makes
zero economic proﬁts. Formally, this is modeled as net output after ﬁxed costs
being equal to yt(j) − χS
y
t ,w i t hχ calibrated such that steady state economic
proﬁts are zero. Technology S
y
t is stochastic and consists of both i.i.d. shocks
to the level of technology and of highly persistent shocks to the growth rate of
technology:
S
y
t = S
y
t−1gt , (18)
gt = g
gr
t giid
t ,
lng
gr
t =( 1− ρg)ln¯ g + ρg lng
gr
t−1 +ˆ ε
gr
t ,
lngiid
t =ˆ ε
iid
t .
Let ˜ Yt =
R 1
0 yt(j)dj,  t =
R 1
0  t(j)dj,a n dkt =
R 1
0 kt(j)dj. Given that factor
markets are competitive so that all ﬁrms face identical costs of hiring aggregates
of capital and labor (14) and (15), we can derive the following aggregate input
demand conditions:
 t =( 1− α)(1 − η)
mct
wt
˜ Yt , (19)
kt = α(1 − η)
mct
ut
˜ Yt , (20)
Nt = ηmct˜ Yt . (21)
2.2.2 Proﬁt Maximization
Following Calvo (1983) it is assumed that each ﬁrm receives price changing
opportunities that follow a geometric distribution. Therefore the probability
(1 − δ) of a ﬁrm’s receiving a new opportunity is independent of how long
ago it was last able to change its price. It is also independent across ﬁrms,
so that it is straightforward to determine the aggregate distribution of prices.
Each ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of real proﬁts. The ﬁrst two
determinants of proﬁts are real revenue Pt(j)yt(j)/Pt and real marginal cost
mctyt(j). In each case demand is given by
yt(j)=Yt
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶−σt
, (22)
which follows directly from consumer demand functions (7) and identical de-
mands from investors and government (see below). Two key features of our
model concern ﬁrst the manner in which ﬁrms set their prices when they re-
ceive an opportunity to do so, and the cost (through excessively large or small
demand) of setting prices far away from prevailing average market prices Pt.
To model the latter, we assume that ﬁrms face a small quadratic cost Φt of
6deviating from the output level of its average competitor, meaning the ﬁrm that
charges the current market average price. The cost is therefore
Φt =
φ
2
Yt
µ
yt(j) − Yt
Yt
¶2
. (23)
The term Yt in front of the quadratic term serves as a scale factor. As for price
setting, we assume that when a ﬁrm j gets an opportunity to decide on its
pricing policy, it chooses both its current price level Vt(j) and the gross rate
vt(j) at which it will update its price from today onwards until the time it is
next allowed to change its policy. At any time t + k when the time t policy is
still in force, its price is therefore
Pt+k(j)=Vt(j)(vt(j))k . (24)
As for the possibility of introducing even more general price paths, it seems
natural to focus on equilibria characterized by a constant expected long-run
growth rate of the nominal anchor.2 The model can then be solved by linearizing
around that growth path, in which case it is suﬃcient to allow ﬁrms to specify
their pricing policies up to the growth rate of their price path. This permits the
use of conventional solution methods, which makes quantitative analysis much
more straightforward.
Firms discount proﬁts expected in period t + k by the k-period ahead real
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and by δ
k, the probability that their
period t pricing policy will still be in force k periods from t.T h e y t a k e i n t o
account aggregate demand for their output (22). The ﬁrm speciﬁci n d e xj
can be dropped in what follows because all ﬁrms that receive a price changing
opportunity at time t will behave identically. Their proﬁt maximization problem
is therefore
Max
Vt,vt
Et
∞ X
k=0
(δβ)
k λt+k
⎡
⎣
Ã
Vt (vt)
k
Pt+k
!1−σt
Yt+k (25)
−mct+k
Ã
Vt (vt)
k
Pt+k
!−σt
Yt+k −
φ
2
Yt+k
µ
yt+k(j) − Yt+k
Yt+k
¶2
⎤
⎦ .
We deﬁne the front-loading term for price setting, the ratio of a new price
setter’s ﬁrst period price to the market average price, as pt ≡ Vt/Pt, cumulative
aggregate inﬂation as Πt,k ≡
Qk
j=1 πt+j for k ≥ 1( ≡ 1 for k =0 ) ,a n dt h e
mark-up term as µt = σt
σt−1.T h e nt h eﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions for the choice
of its initial price level Vt and its inﬂation updating rate vt are
pt = µt
Et
P∞
k=0 (δβ)
k λt+kyt+k(j)
³
mct+k + φ
³
yt+k(j)−Yt+k
Yt+k
´´
Et
P∞
k=0 (δβ)
k λt+kyt+k(j)
³
(vt)k
Πt,k
´ , (26)
2This includes both a constant steady state growth rate of the nominal anchor and a unit
root in that growth rate, as in this paper.
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P∞
k=0 (δβ)
k kλt+kyt+k(j)
³
mct+k + φ
³
yt+k(j)−Yt+k
Yt+k
´´
Et
P∞
k=0 (δβ)
k kλt+kyt+k(j)
³
(vt)k
Πt,k
´ . (27)
The intuition for this result becomes much clearer once these conditions are
log-linearized and combined with the log-linearization of the aggregate price
index. As this is algebraically very involved, the details are presented in the
Technical Appendix. We discuss the key equations here. They replace the
traditional one-equation New Keynesian Phillips curve with a three-equation
system in ˆ πt, ˆ vt and an inertial variable ˆ ψt:
Etˆ πt+1 =ˆ πt
µ
2
β
− δ
¶
+ˆ vt ((1 − δ)(1+δ)) + ˆ ψt
µ
δ(1 + δ) −
2
β
¶
(28)
−
2(1 − δ)(1− δβ)
(δβ)(1+φ¯ µ¯ σ)
(c mct +ˆ µt)+
(1 − δ)
(1 + φ¯ µ¯ σ)
¡
Etˆ µt+1 − ˆ µt
¢
,
Etˆ vt+1 =ˆ vt +
(1 − δβ)
2
(δβ)
2
δ
1 − δ
ˆ ψt −
(1 − δβ)
2
(δβ)
2
δ
1 − δ
ˆ πt (29)
+
(1 − δβ)
2
(δβ)
2 (1 + φ¯ µ¯ σ)
(c mct +ˆ µt) ,
ˆ ψt = δˆ ψt−1 +( 1− δ)ˆ vt−1 − ˆ ε
π∗
t . (30)
Equations (28) and (29) show the evolution of the two forward-looking variables,
ˆ πt and ˆ vt. The most notable feature is the presence of the term (1 + φ¯ µ¯ σ) in
the denominator of the terms multiplying marginal cost. It results from the
upward-sloping ﬁrm-level marginal cost curve, and as long as φ>0 it makes
prices less sensitive to changes in marginal cost. Note that both the steepness
of the marginal cost curve φ and the elasticity of the demand curve ¯ σ aﬀect this
term. Equation (30) is, in deviation form and allowing for permanent changes
in the inﬂation target ˆ ε
π∗
t , the weighted average of all those past ﬁrm-speciﬁc
inﬂation rates ˆ vt that are still in force between periods t − 1 and t,a n dw h i c h
therefore enter into period t aggregate inﬂation. This term is inertial, and the
degree of inertia depends directly on δ and therefore on the average contract
length.
The following key equation follows from the diﬀerencing and log-linearization
of the aggregate price index:
ˆ πt =
1 − δ
δ
ˆ pt + ˆ ψt . (31)
The two components of this equation reﬂect the two main sources of aggregate
inﬂation inertia in response to shocks. The ﬁrst term ˆ pt represents inﬂation
caused by signiﬁcant instantaneous price changes (relative to the aggregate price
level) of new price setters, so called ‘front loading’. Note that in a Calvo-Yun
model this is the only term driving inﬂation. But in our case the quadratic cost
8term means that signiﬁcant front loading can be very costly, because it generally
causes big deviations from industry average output during part of the duration
of a pricing policy. New price setters will therefore respond as much as possible
through changes in their updating rates ˆ vt. But these only slowly feed through
to aggregate inﬂation via ˆ ψt, which initially mainly reﬂects the continuing eﬀects
of price updating decisions made before the current realization of shocks. The
result is that past inﬂation, by (31) and (30), becomes a key determinant of
current inﬂation.
In our sensitivity analysis we will report not only the ﬁt of our model, but
also that of a Calvo (1983) model with Yun (1996) indexation to steady state
inﬂation, augmented as in the baseline case by ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal cost and
sticky user costs. That model, in our casew i t hm a r k u ps h o c k s ,g i v e sr i s et ot h e
following one-equation representation of the inﬂation process, the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve:
ˆ πt = βˆ πt+1 +
((1 − δβ)(1− δ))
δ(1 + φ¯ µ¯ σ)
c mct +
(1 − δ)
δ(1 + φ¯ µ¯ σ)
¡
ˆ µt − δβˆ µt+1
¢
. (32)
This equation can be directly derived from (28), (29) and (30) by setting ˆ vt =
ˆ ψt =0 .I no t h e rw o r d s ,aﬁrm in our model is always free to behave exactly like
a Calvo-Yun price setter by front-loading all its price changes into the current
price. However, this is generally far from optimal, especially if the processes
driving inﬂation are highly persistent. And for aggregate inﬂation dynamics, as
is well known, this kind of price setting implies very little inﬂation inertia and
persistence.
2.3 Household Wage Setting
Every ﬁrm j must use composite labor (14), a CES aggregate with elasticity of
substitution σw
t of the labor varieties supplied by diﬀerent households. Firms’
costs minimization, aggregated over all ﬁrms, yields demands
Lt(i)=Lt
µ
Wt(i)
Wt
¶−σw
t
, (33)
where the aggregate nominal wage is given by
Wt =
µZ 1
0
(Wt(i))
1−σw
t di
¶ 1
1−σw
t
. (34)
The term driving wage inﬂation is the log-diﬀerence between the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure and the real wage. The marginal
rate of substitution is given by
mrst =
SL
t ψLt(i)
1
γ
λt
. (35)
9Household nominal wage setting can then be shown to follow the same pattern
as the price setting discussed in the previous subsection. With an appropriate
change of notation, and after replacing d mct with d mrst − ˆ wt,i tl e a d st oa n
identical set of equations to (28)-(31) above. The reader is referred to the
Technical Appendix for details.
2.4 Financial Intermediaries
We assume that all capital is intermediated by a continuum of intermediaries
indexed by z ∈ [0,1]. These agents are competitive in their input market, renting
capital Kt from households at rental rate rk
t . On the other hand, they are
monopolistically competitive in their output market, lending capital varieties
kt(z) to ﬁrms at rental rates ut(z). This gives rise to sluggish user costs of
capital, which interact in the model with sticky wages to produce stickiness in
marginal cost.
Every ﬁrm j must use composite capital, a CES aggregate with elasticity
of substitution σk of the varieties supplied by diﬀerent intermediaries. Firms’
costs minimization yields demands
kt(z)=kt
µ
ut(z)
ut
¶−σk
, (36)
where the overall user cost to ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y
ut =
µZ 1
0
(ut(z))
1−σk
dz
¶ 1
1−σk
. (37)
The proﬁt maximization problem of the intermediary follows the same pattern
as ﬁrms’ problem. We deﬁne the gross intermediation spread as st = ut/rk
t and
the gross rate of change of user cost as πk
t = ut/ut−1. With an appropriate
change of notation and after replacing d mct with −ˆ st, we obtain an identical set
of equations to (28)-(31) above. The Technical Appendix contains the details.
2.5 Government
We assume that there is an exogenous stochastic process for government spend-
ing GOVt
GOVt = S
gov
t GOV , (38)
with demands for individual varieties having the same form as consumption
demand for varieties (7). The government’s ﬁscal policy is assumed to be Ricar-
dian, with the government budget balanced period by period through lump-sum
taxes τt, and with an initial stock of government bonds of zero. The budget
constraint is therefore
τt +
Mt − Mt−1
Pt
= GOVt . (39)
10We assume that the central bank pursues an interest rate rule for its policy
instrument it.I t sq u a r t e r l yi n ﬂation target π∗
t is assumed to follow a unit root
process:
π∗
t = π∗
t−1επ∗
t . (40)
The year-on-year inﬂation rate is denoted as π4,t = πtπt−1πt−2πt−3.T h ec u r -
rent year-on-year inﬂation target is simply the annualized quarter-on-quarter
inﬂation target, π∗
4,t =( π∗
t)
4. Finally, the steady state gross real interest rate is
given by 1/βg,w h e r eβg = β/¯ g.T h e nw eh a v e
i4
t =
£
i4
t−1
¤ξint £
β
−4
g π4,t
¤1−ξint
"
π4,t+1
π∗
4,t
#ξπ
Sint
t , (41)
where Sint
t is an autocorrelated monetary policy shock. A government policy is
deﬁned as a set of stochastic processes {is, π∗
s, τs}
∞
s=t such that, given stochastic
processes
©
Ps, Sint
s
ª∞
s=t, the conditions (39) and (41) hold for all s ≥ t.
2.6 Equilibrium
An allocation is given by a list of stochastic processes {Bs, Ms, Cs, Is, Ls, Ks,
ks, Ys, Lt(i,j), kt(z,j), i,j,z ∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t.Aprice system is a list of stochastic
processes {Ps, Ws, Rk
s, Us}
∞
s=t. Shock processes are a list of stochastic processes
{Sc
s , SL
s , Sinv
s , Sgov
s , Sint
s , µs, µw
s , Sy
s, π∗
s}
∞
s=t. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned
as follows:
An equilibrium is an allocation, a price system, a government policy and
shock processes such that
(a) given the government policy, the price system, shock processes, the re-
strictions on wage setting, and the sequence {Ls}
∞
s=t, the allocation and the
sequences {V w
s (i), vw
s (i), i ∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t solve households’ utility maximization
problem,
(b) given the government policy, the price system, shock processes, the re-
strictions on price setting, and the sequence {Ys}
∞
s=t, the allocation and the
sequences {Vs(j), vs(j), j ∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t solve ﬁrms’ cost minimization and proﬁt
maximization problem,
(c) given the government policy, the price system, shock processes, the re-
strictions on setting user costs, and the sequence {ks}
∞
s=t, the sequences
©
V k
s (z),
vk
s(z), z ∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t solve intermediaries’ proﬁt maximization problem,
(d) the goods market clears at all times,
Aggregate Output : Yt =
µZ 1
0
yt(j)
σt−1
σt dj
¶ σt
σt−1
, (42)
Auxiliary Variable : ˜ Yt =
Z 1
0
yt(j)dj ,
Goods Clearing : yt(j)=ct(j)+It(j)+GOVt(j)+Nt(j) ∀ j,
Aggregate Goods Clearing: Yt = Ct + It + GOVt + Nt .
11(e) the labor market clears at all times,
 t =
Z 1
0
⎡
⎣
µZ 1
0
Lt(i,j)
σw
t −1
σw
t di
¶
σw
t
σw
t −1
⎤
⎦dj , (43)
(f) the market for capital clears at all times,
Firm Demand for Capital : kt =
Z 1
0
⎡
⎣
µZ 1
0
kt(z,j)
σk−1
σk dz
¶ σk
σk−1
⎤
⎦dj ,
Intermediary Supply/Demand of Capital : ˜ kt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
˜ kt(z,j)dzdj , (44)
Capital Market Clearing I : kt(z,j)=˜ kt(z,j) ∀ z,j ,
Household Capital Stock: Kt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Kt(z,j)dzdj ,
Capital Market Clearing II : ˜ kt(z,j)=xtKt(z,j) ∀ z,j .
(g) the bond market clears at all times,
Bt =0 . (45)
Outside of steady state it will generally be true that ˜ Yt 6= Yt and xtKt 6= kt.3
It is however straightforward to show that ˜ Y = ¯ Y , b ˜ Y = ˆ Y , ¯ x ¯ K = ¯ k,a n dˆ x+ ˆ K =
ˆ k, so that log-linearization that assumes equality between these aggregates is
valid.
3This does not concern us for labor because we do not track an aggregate labor supply
variable.
123 Estimation Methodology, Priors, and Calibra-
tion
3.1 Estimation Methodology
The model above model is log-linearized and then estimated in two steps in
DYNARE-MATLAB. In the ﬁrst step, we compute the posterior mode using an
optimization routine (CSMINWEL) developed by Chris Sims. Using the mode
as a starting point, we then use the Metropolis-Hasting (MH) algorithm to
construct the posterior distributions of the model and the marginal likelihood.4
We choose as our baseline case a particular combination of structural model
features and priors for parameters, and use the parameter estimates for this
case to construct impulse responses. Sensitivity analysis will be performed by
either restricting certain parameters or shocks, or by removing some features of
the structural model, and by comparing the marginal likelihood to that of the
baseline case.
3.2 Calibration of Parameters that Determine the Steady
State
The list of those model parameters that pin down the steady state are listed in
the top panel of Table 1. We set the annual steady-state rate of productivity
growth to 1.7 percent, the average over our sample. The rate of productivity
growth and quarterly discount rate β together pin down the equilibrium real
interest rate in the model. Given productivity growth of 1.7 percent, we set
the discount rate at 0.999 to generate an equilibrium annual real interest rate
of 2.1 percent. The quarterly depreciation rate on capital is assumed to be
0.025, implying an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent. The elasticities of
substitution among goods, labor inputs and capital inputs are assumed be 5.35,
7.25 and 11.00 respectively, resulting in markups of 23%, 16% and 10%. These
assumptions are combined with a share of capital in valued added of 0.28, while
we will experiment with a range of assumptions for the share of proﬁts prior
to ﬁxed costs, which is driven by the parameter η. Government is assumed to
absorb 18 percent of GDP in steady state. Most of these values are similar
to what have been employed in other DSGE models of the US economy–see
Juillard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2005) and Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti
(2004).
4For one estimation run the whole process takes anywhere from 6-8 hours to complete
using a Pentium 4 processor (3.0 GHz) on a personal computer with 1GB of RAM. DYNARE
includes a number of debugging features to determine if the optimization routines have truly
found the optimum and if enough draws have been executed for the posterior distributions to
be accurate.
133.3 Speciﬁcation of the Stochastic Processes
Table 2 reports the speciﬁcations of the stochastic processes for the 10 structural
shocks in the model.5 Following Juillard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2005) we
classify shocks as demand and supply shocks depending on the short-run covari-
ance they generate between inﬂation and real GDP. Shocks that raise demand
by more than supply and cause inﬂation to rise in the short run are classiﬁed
as demand shocks, while shocks that produce a negative covariance between
inﬂation and GDP are classiﬁed as supply shocks. Based on this classiﬁcation
system, shocks to government absorption, the Fed funds rate, the inﬂation tar-
get, consumption, and investment, [d s
gov
t , d sint
t , ˆ π
∗
t, b sc
t, d sinv
t ], are all classiﬁed as
demand shocks. In the case of the shock to the inﬂation target we assume that
it follows a unit root, to account for permanent historical shifts in long-term
inﬂation expectations. In all other cases we allow these shocks to be serially
correlated. Shocks to wage and price markups as well as labor supply shocks,
[c µw
t ,b µt, c sL
t ], are classiﬁed as supply shocks. Labor supply shocks are assumed
to be serially correlated, while both markup shocks have zero serial correlation.
The remaining 2 shocks determine the growth rate of productivity (b gt)a n d
are split into 2 components, b g
gr
t and b giid
t .T h eﬁrst component b g
gr
t is assumed to
be serially correlated (b g
gr
t = ρgrb g
gr
t−1 +ˆ ε
gr
t ), while the second component is as-
sumed to be white noise (b giid
t =ˆ ε
iid
t ).T h ec l a s s i ﬁcation of the b giid
t shock is sim-
ple because increases in its value make output rise and inﬂation fall. However,
the classiﬁcation of the b g
gr
t shock as a demand or supply shock is more diﬃ-
cult. Interestingly, when shocks to this component are highly serially correlated
they generate responses that are indistinguishable from what many professional
forecasters would characterize as shocks to consumer and business conﬁdence in
that they result in sustained increases in aggregate demand and a temporary,
but persistent, increase in inﬂation and hours worked.
3.4 Prior Distributions
Our assumptions about the prior distributions can be grouped into two cat-
egories: (1) parameters for which we have relatively strong priors based on
our reading of existing empirical evidence and their implications for macroeco-
n o m i cd y n a m i c s ,a n d( 2 )p a r a m e t e r sw h e r ew eh a v ef a i r l yd i ﬀuse priors. Broadly
speaking, parameters in the former group include the core structural parameters
that inﬂuence, for example, the lags in the monetary transmission mechanism,
while parameters in the latter category include the parameters that characterize
t h es t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s e s( i . e . ,t h ev a r i a n c e so ft h es h o c k sa n dt h ed e g r e eo fp e r -
sistence in the shock processes). Our strategy is to estimate the model with a
base-case set of priors and then to report results based on plausible alternatives.
The ﬁrst, fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 3 report our assumptions about
the prior distributions for the 12 structural core parameters of the model. On
5In their model of the US economy, Smets and Wouters (2004) also allow for ten structural
shocks, six of which are speciﬁed as ﬁrst-order stochastic processes and four of which are
assumed to be white noise.
14the household side this includes the habit-persistence parameter [v], the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply [γ], the adjustment cost parameters on capital and
investment [θk,θ i]. There are six parameter characterizing pricing policies, the
three parameters that determine the duration of pricing policies in the markets
for goods, labor and capital [δ,δw,δk] and the three quadratic cost parameters
that determine the steepness of the marginal cost6 curve for prices, wages, and
user costs [φ,φw,φ k]. Finally we have the two parameters of the interest rate
reaction function [ξint,ξπ]. The fourth column reports the type of distribution
we assume (Beta, Normal, Inverted Gamma). Following standard conventions
we will be using Beta distributions for parameters that fall between zero and one,
inverted gamma (invg) distributions for parameters that need to be constrained
to be greater than zero and normal (norm) distributions in other cases. The ﬁrst
column of each table reports our priors for the means of each parameter and the
value in the ﬁfth column represents a measure of uncertainty in our prior beliefs
about the mean (measured as a standard error). The second and third columns
report the posterior means of the parameters, and 90% conﬁdence intervals that
are based on 40,000 replications of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The
assumptions about and results for the remaining parameters are reported in a
similar format in Tables 4 and 5.
3.4.1 Priors about Structural Parameters (Table 3)
Habit Persistence in Consumption [v]: We set the prior at 0.90 as high values
are required to generate realistic lags in the monetary transmission mechanism
and hump-shaped consumption dynamics–see Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti
(2004) for a discussion of the role of habit persistence in generating hump-
shaped consumption dynamics in response to interest rate shocks. This prior
is somewhat higher than other studies such as Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher
(2001), who use a value of 0.7.
Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply [γ]: We set the prior at 0.50. Pencavel
(1986) reports that most microeconomic estimates of the Frisch elasticity are
between 0 and 0.45, and our calibration is at the upper end of that range, in
line with much of the business cycle literature.7
Adjustment Costs on Changing Capital and Investment [θk,θi]: We set priors
e q u a lt o5a n d5 0f o rθk and θi. These assumptions are based on analyzing the
simulation properties of the model. The data do not seem to have much to say
about these parameters other than that they cannot be zero or very large. This
is not uncommon.
Duration of Pricing Policies [δ,δw,δk]: The duration of pricing policies is
(1/(1−δ)). I nt h eb a s ec a s ew es e tt h ep r i o re q u a lt oat h r e eq u a r t e r sd u r a t i o n
for prices, wages and user costs, therefore the priors equal 0.66 for [δ,δw,δk].
6Or the marginal rate of substitution minus the real wage (for wages), or minus the gross
intermediation spread (for user costs).
7As discussed by Chang and Kim (2005), a very low Frisch elasticity makes it diﬃcult to
explain cyclical ﬂuctuations in hours worked, and they present a heterogenous agent model in
which aggregate labor supply is considerably more elastic than individual labor supply.
15This is based on our reading of the empirical literature for the US and on the
results cited in ECB (2005). In the US, consumer prices are re-set on average
(slightly faster than) every two quarters, while the average for producer prices
is four quarters. As our model does not distinguish between the two, it seems
reasonable to choose an intermediate prior of three quarters. The priors for
wages and user costs are set to the same value, but at least for user costs we
will consider alternatives in the sensitivity analysis.
Steepness of Marginal Cost Curve [φ,φw,φ k]: Simulation experiments with
the model suggest that plausible values for these parameters might fall between
0.50 and 2.0. In our base case we set the prior at 1.0. Our sensitivity analysis
includes a case where all three of these parameters are restricted to be zero.
There are signiﬁcant interactions between these adjustment cost parameters
and the duration parameters that will be explained below.
Interest Rate Reaction Function [ξint,ξπ]: We impose prior means of 0.5 to
be consistent with previous work, but we make these priors diﬀuse to allow them
to be inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by the data.
3.4.2 Priors about Structural Shocks (Tables 4-5)
Persistence parameters for the structural shocks [ρgov, ρinv, ρc, ρint, ρgr, ρL,
ρµ, ρµw]: Table 4 reports the assumptions about the priors for these parame-
ters. With the exception of the shocks to the markups and the autocorrelated
productivity shocks we set the prior means equal to 0.85 with a fairly diﬀuse
prior standard deviation of 0.10. For the two markup shocks we impose zero
serial correlation. These priors are consistent with other studies such as Smets
and Wouters (2004) and Juillard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2005).
We treat the prior on the serial correlation parameter for the productivity
shocks diﬀerently. Here, we utilize a tight prior so that the model can generate
highly persistent movements in the growth rate relative to its long-run steady
state. As mentioned earlier, this is necessary to explain some facts in our sample
(persistent upward revisions in expectations of medium-term growth prospects),
b u ti ti sa l s om o r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ed a t ao v e rt h el a s tc e n t u r yi nt h eU n i t e d
States and other countries, where productivity growth has departed from its
long-term average growth rate for as long as decades in many cases. Obviously,
there will not be a lot of information in our short sample for estimating this
parameter, and not surprisingly, the data will be silent on the matter as it should
be.8 We are considering adding expectations of long-term productivity growth
to the list of observable variables to help identify this parameter, but have not
a t t e m p t e dt od os oa tt h i sp o i n t .
Structural shocks standard errors [σˆ εgov, σˆ εinv, σˆ εc, σˆ εint, σˆ επ∗, σˆ εiid, σˆ εgr,
σˆ εL, σˆ εµ, σˆ εµw]: Table 5 reports our assumptions about the priors for these
parameters. The strategy here was to develop rough priors of the means by
looking at the model’s impulse response functions, conditional on all the other
8Provided the researcher can provide sensible priors, Bayesian techniques oﬀer a major
advantage over other system estimators such as maximum likelihood, which in small samples
can often allow key parameters such as this one to wander oﬀ in nonsensical directions.
16priors, and then to form a diﬀuse prior around this mean in order to let the data
adjust the parameters in a way that improves the overall ﬁto ft h em o d e l .T h e
speciﬁc values for these priors are not intuitive, as they require a very detailed
knowledge of the structure of the model. Consequently, the reader might be well-
advised to turn to the model’s IRFs (which are based on the model’s posterior
distribution) to interpret how important each one of these shocks is.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
To be completed.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
To be completed.
In Figure 1 we display the impulse response to a 50 basis points contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. This illustrates the substantial contribution of
c a s c a d i n gt os t r u c t u r a li n ﬂation inertia. In this case we have calibrated the
contract length of price, wage and user cost contracts to be unformly low at
only 2 quarters, while the share of intermediates in production is high (but real-
istic) at η =0 .75. We observe that despite the low degree of nominal rigidities
inﬂation is very inertial, and a contractionary shock has real eﬀects normally
only associated with much longer contract lengths.
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5C o n c l u s i o n
To be completed.
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19Table 1: Assumptions About Parameters and Steady-State Ratios
Parameters: Value
Discount Rate β 0.999
Share of Capital in Value Added α 0.28
Capital Depreciation Rate ∆ 0.025
Share of Government Spending in Steady State Output ωg 0.18
Steady State Quarterly Growth Rate ¯ g (1.017)
1
4
Elasticity of Substitution among Goods in Steady State ¯ σ 5.35
Elasticity of Substitution among Labor Inputs in Steady State σw 7.25
Elasticity of Substitution among Capital Inputs σk 11.00
Steady-State Ratios:
Labor’s Income Share 0.59
Consumption-to-GDP Ratio 0.62
Investment-to-GDP Ratio 0.20
Government Spending-to-GDP Ratio 0.18
Price Markup ¯ σ/(¯ σ − 1) 1.23
Wage Markup σw/(σw − 1) 1.16
User Cost Markup σk/(σk − 1) 1.10
Table 2: Speciﬁcation of the Stochastic Processes
Assumptions about the Shocks Stochastic Processes
Total Factor Productivity b gt = b g
gr
t + b giid
t
Demand Shocks
Government Absorption d s
gov
t = ρgov d s
gov
t−1 +ˆ ε
gov
t
Investment d sinv
t = ρinv
d sinv
t−1 +ˆ ε
inv
t
Marginal Utility of Consumption b sc
t = ρc d sc
t−1 +ˆ ε
c
t
Monetary Policy Reaction Function d sint
t = ρint
d sint
t−1 +ˆ ε
int
t
Inﬂation Target ˆ π
∗
t =ˆ π
∗
t−1 +ˆ ε
π∗
t
Autocorrelated Growth Shocks b g
gr
t = ρgrb g
gr
t−1 +ˆ ε
gr
t
Supply Shocks
Price Markup b µt =ˆ ε
µ
t
Wage Markup c µw
t =ˆ ε
µw
t
Marginal Disutility of Labor c sL
t = ρL
d sL
t−1 +ˆ ε
L
t
I.i.d. Growth Shocks b giid
t =ˆ ε
iid
t
20Table 3: Estimation Results
Parameters
Prior Mean Estimate 90% Interval Density Std
v 0.90 Beta 0.10
γ 0.50 Normal 0.10
δ 0.66 Beta 0.10
δw 0.66 Beta 0.10
δk 0.66 Beta 0.10
φ 1.00 Normal 0.20
φw 1.00 Normal 0.20
φk 1.00 Normal 0.20
θk 5.00 Normal 1.00
θi 50.00 Normal 10.00
ξint 0.50 Normal 0.20
ξπ 0.50 Normal 0.20
Table 4: Estimation Results Continued
Parameters
Prior Estimate 90% Interval Density Std
ρgov 0.85 Beta 0.10
ρinv 0.85 Beta 0.10
ρc 0.85 Beta 0.10
ρint 0.85 Beta 0.10
ρgr 0.95 Beta 0.01
ρL 0.85 Beta 0.10
21Table 5: Estimation Results Continued
Standard Deviation of Shocks
Prior Estimate 90% Interval Density std
σˆ εgov 0.025 invg inf
σˆ εinv 0.2000 invg inf
σˆ εc 0.0250 invg inf
σˆ εint 0.0100 invg inf
σˆ επ∗ 0.0010 invg inf
σˆ εiid 0.0010 invg inf
σˆ εgr 0.2000 invg inf
σˆ εL 0.0050 invg inf
σˆ εµ 0.0250 invg inf
σˆ εµw 0.0250 invg inf
22